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Stopping the Clock on Coverage: Resolving the 
Conundrum of LHWCA Maritime Status 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As far back as the Grecian and Roman empires, civilizations recognized 
the unparalleled economic gain offered by trade on the high seas and created 
systems to harness that profit. The ancient Greeks and Romans built their 
empires on maritime commerce. The Roman Empire thrived on its 
commercial ships, which carried up to 400 tons of cargo in a single vessel to 
merchant ports throughout the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Atlantic 
Ocean.1 In short time, the competing commercial interests that arose between 
merchants, shippers, and laborers required laws regulating their interactions. 
Thus, the Romans developed their own maritime law by borrowing from the 
precepts of Grecian, and more specifically Rhodian, law of the sea.2 Greek 
culture and Greek courts alike revered and protected maritime commerce; that 
reverence became a cornerstone of admiralty law.3 
Centuries after the Greeks and Romans flourished, the search for 
maritime trade routes to the Far East prompted the discovery of the Americas. 
For colonists in the New World, ports became the gateway for all commerce. 
Soon, cities grew up around major ports. Colonists built railways and roads to 
connect these port cities, crisscrossing the expanse between the coasts and 
carrying goods and people into the heartland. This network of passageways 
that intended to achieve ease of access to ports contributed to the growing 
recognition of the American colonies as an interconnected whole. Upon 
gaining independence, maritime commerce and its law remained so integral 
to America’s burgeoning identity as a unified nation that the Framers 
expressly provided for federal admiralty jurisdiction in the Constitution itself.4 
That federal jurisdiction controls the operation of an industry woven through 
the fabric of American life and trade, and, in so doing, governs the safety and 
well–being of an army of American maritime laborers. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by ALEX S. AUGHTRY. 
 1. Lionel Casson, Ships And Seafaring Vessels in Ancient Times 105 
(University of Texas Press, 1994). In his most recognized work, Parallel Lives, 
Plutarch described how Cato the Elder (234–149 B.C.) organized associations of 
investors that engaged in the joint venture of underwriting ships for profit. 
Plutarch, Cato the Elder, in Makers of Rome 144 (Ian Scott-Kilvert trans., 1965). 
 2. Dig. 14.2.9 (Volsusius Maecianus, From the Rhodian Law) (Alan Watson 
trans.). 
 3. See generally Edward E. Cohen, Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts (1973). 
 4. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
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Even after the industrial revolution and the dawning of the 
technological age,5 the maritime industry remains solidly at the foundation 
of the American economy. The contemporary United States maritime 
industry encompasses over 40,000 vessels and provides jobs to 
approximately 13 million Americans.6 Producing a $100 billion economic 
output each year, the industry yields $29 billion in wages and $11 billion 
in taxes annually.7 Moreover, roughly thirty percent of the national 
economy depends on imports and exports8—ninety-five percent of which 
are transported by sea.9 It is not surprising, then, that the maritime industry 
still drives Americans’ understanding of both the domestic economy and 
the country’s interactions with the rest of the world. 
Maritime trade and transport does not happen on its own. The industry 
thrives through the sweat—and sometimes the blood—of hardworking 
men and women. The work of the maritime laborer remains difficult and 
dangerous. In 2005, the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs 
received roughly 27,000 reports of on-the-job injuries from longshoremen 
and harbor workers alone.10 Since maritime workers make up such a large 
portion of the working population, and because the industry remains so 
vital to the American economy, the need to protect workers injured in 
furtherance of maritime commerce is crucial. With this very interest in 
mind, Congress conceived the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act (LHWCA) in 1927.11 
Unfortunately, ambiguities regarding the scope of coverage have 
plagued the LHWCA since its inception. The confusion surrounding 
LHWCA coverage first centered largely on a lack of clarity as to the extent 
of the Act’s jurisdiction. The murkiness surrounding coverage led Justice 
                                                                                                             
 5. Maritime commercial efforts now incorporate advanced technologies to 
track shipments and port activity, monitor weather and traffic on the seas, and to 
ensure security in the shipping industry, among other things. See Michael S. 
Bruno, Port Security and Technology: The US Perspective, Stevens Institute of 
Technology, www.oceanologyinternational.com/RXUK/RXUK [https://perma 
.cc/A7ZH-9RCB](Mar. 12, 2012). 
 6. Americas Maritime Industry: The Foundation of American Seapower, 
Navy League of the United States 7, 13, http://www.seapowermagazine.org/pdf 
_files/americas-maritime-industry.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5WY-H9EK] (last 
visited October 24, 2014) [hereinafter Navy League]. 
 7. Id. at 14. 
 8. World Trade-to-GDP Ratios, The World Bank (2015), http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS. 
 9. Navy League, supra note 6, at 13.  
 10. DLHWC Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Labor http://www.dol.gov/owcp 
/dlhwc/lsfact.htm [http://perma.cc/56FC-ZGNE] (last visited October 5, 2014). 
 11. 33 U.S.C. § 901–950. In a lay sense, longshoremen and harbor workers 
are those land-based workers that facilitate maritime commerce once a boat has 
reached the pier. 
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Brennan to label the 1927 Act “a jurisdictional monstrosity.”12 One 
lawmaker characterized the Act as “about as unclear as any statute could 
conceivably be.”13 Regrettably, steps taken to increase clarity ultimately 
gave birth to new ambiguities, only amplifying the already complicated 
application of the law. 
Jurisdictional problems have commonly arisen in determining who is 
actually covered by the LHWCA. As with any specialized compensation 
structure, “there will always be a boundary to coverage, and there will 
always be people who cross it during their employment.”14 Today, the 
boundary questions revolve around the connection between the injured 
worker and actual maritime duties. In particular, tension exists in assessing 
the worker’s temporal connection to maritime tasks and the reach of that 
connection. 
The health of the maritime industry and its workers depends upon 
resolving that tension. The expeditious and economical provision of 
benefits in a workers’ compensation structure rises and falls on ease of 
application. Until a clear line of coverage can be drawn, both workers and 
employers will continue to suffer from the lack of predictability and 
uniformity in LHWCA enforcement, and workers will have to fight for 
benefits. Disputes over whether coverage applies can be tied up in courts 
for years, depriving injured employees of financial resources at the time 
when they need them most. Further, these disputes hurt their employers as 
well, prolonging disputes, costs, and ill will. Unclear lines of coverage 
harm maritime businesses, and in turn harm the American maritime 
industry as a whole. The wasted costs stemming from the vagaries of the 
LHWCA incentivize diversion of trade—and profits—to other countries 
with less onerous coverage structures.15 Failure to resolve the gray areas 
of coverage under the Act threatens to degrade an industry that has long 
been a bastion of the American economy. A clear and predictable line must 
be drawn to stop the harm felt by all parties. 
This comment argues that Congress should adopt a bright line standard 
that refines the temporal restriction urged by Judge Clement in her 
concurring opinion in New Orleans Depot Services, Inc. v. Director, Office 
of Worker's Compensation Programs,16 into a workable rule.17 Part I 
                                                                                                             
 12. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 720 (1980). 
 13. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments 
of 1981: Hearing on S. 1182 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. On 
Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong. 5 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Hearing] 
(statement of Don Nickles, Senator of Oklahoma). 
 14. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 223–24 (1969). 
 15. For a more thorough explanation of the threat of diversion, see infra Part 
II, Section C. 
 16. 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Clement, J. concurring). 
 17. Id. 
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examines the origins and creation of the LHWCA. Part II discusses the 
1972 Amendments to the Act, exploring both the issues Congress set out 
to remedy and the new questions created by its enactment. Part III delves 
more deeply into the resulting “status test,” examining its importance in 
determining LHWCA eligibility.18 Part IV highlights the question of 
temporality created by the status test and emphasized by Judge Clement. 
Finally, Part V advocates a statutory revision of the definition of 
“employee” in order to clarify congressional intent and further the best 
interests of the shipping industry, its employees, and the national 
economy. 
Pending enactment of that bright line rule, this article gathers the 
growing authorities that warrant its adoption by the courts and urges 
adoption as the best—if not only—way to ensure effective provision of the 
benefits the LHWCA seeks to afford. While it is true that the status test 
still suffers confounding ambiguities—and that those ambiguities threaten 
the health of the maritime industry—this attainable and workable solution 
is already percolating in admiralty law. The following pages will 
crystallize that cure and provide advocates with effective tools for tackling 
the conundrum of LHWCA coverage through interpretation of existing 
case law and legislation. 
I. BORN OUT OF NEED: THE CREATION OF THE LHWCA 
Prior to the 20th century, laborers generally had no realistic claim of 
action against their employers for injuries sustained in the course of their 
work.19 The rise of the Industrial Revolution created new and pervasive 
dangers for workers, and the resulting injuries became increasingly severe: 
“By the turn of the century . . . it became apparent that the toll of industrial 
accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become 
                                                                                                             
 18. 33 U.S.C. § 902. 
 19. Aubrey E. Denton & John H. Hughes, Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation in Louisiana 3 (National Business Institute, 1995). The lack of 
action resulted largely from the “fellow servant rule,” which barred damage 
actions arising from the negligence or fault of a fellow servant. See, e.g. Nappa v. 
Erie R. Co., 195 N.Y. 176 (1909). Another obstacle to recovery was the equitable 
theory of contributory negligence, which barred liability of employers where an 
injury resulted at least partially from the workers’ own carelessness, unless the 
employer’s negligence was gross, willful, or wanton. See, e.g., Schirm v. Dene 
Steam Shipping Co., 222 F. 587 (E.D.N.Y. 1914). See also, Wex S. Malone, 
Louisiana Workmen’s Compensations Law and Practice 7 (West Publishing Co., 
1951). To add insult to injury, the common law assumption of the risk doctrine 
barred remedy in many cases on the ground that the employee knowingly 
encountered certain dangers while in the course of employment, and was “deemed 
to accept all ‘ordinary’ or ‘usual’ risks.” See, e.g., The Maharajah, 49 F. 111 (2d 
Cir. N.Y.1891). See also id., at 11–12. 
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enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who was to pay 
for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry.”20 
A. Protecting the Unprotected 
In the area of maritime employment, admiralty law afforded special 
remedies to injured maritime workers who fell into the category of seamen—
but no specialized coverage existed for their land-based counterparts, 
longshoremen and harbor workers.21 Most assumed that these workers would 
be covered by state workers’ compensation acts.22 
But in 1917, the Supreme Court rejected this assumption, denying 
coverage under a New York state compensation statute to a worker killed 
on the gangway during the process of loading and unloading cargo.23 The 
Court reasoned that injuries over navigable waters were subject solely to 
federal jurisdiction under admiralty law; application of a state 
compensation structure to an injury over water would directly conflict with 
that jurisdiction.24 The case resulted in what famously came to be known 
as the “Jensen line,” drawn strictly at the water’s edge. Longshoremen 
injured on the portion of the pier with pilings on land were covered by 
state compensation acts, but once they crossed over the Jensen line to the 
                                                                                                             
 20. Malone, supra note 19, at 32. To illustrate, forty-six workers were killed 
in the South Chicago United States Steel Corporation factory in 1906. Carl 
Gersuny, Work Injuries and Adversary Processes in Two New England Textile 
Mills, 51 The Bus. History Rev. 337 (1977). A shocking 526 men were killed in 
one year in the course of employment in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania: 125 
rail-workers, 71 miners, and 195 steel workers. Id. For more information on labor 
conditions and the viability of compensation actions during the industrial 
revolution, see Arthur F. McEvoy’s essay on the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire 
that killed 146 people, with 62 victims jumping to their deaths. The Triangle 
Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911: Social Change, Industrial Accidents, and the 
Evolution of Common-Sense Causality, 20 Law and Social Inquiry 621–51 
(Spring, 1995). McEvoy explains: “The fire symbolized the helplessness of 
industrial workers in the face of dangers over which they had little control and to 
which the law had hitherto, for the most part, simply abandoned them. It made 
clear in a new and powerful way that industrial accidents had causes whose roots 
lay in employers’ near-total power over the workplace environment; causes which 
government had the capacity and the responsibility to address.” Id. at 622. 
 21. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (granting a right to seamen to 
recover for injuries sustained as a result of the “un-seaworthiness” of the vessel). 
The Osceola’s distinction of seamen was left undefined by the Court, but was 
designed to distinguish sailors from their land-based brethren. Denton, supra note 
19, at 3 (interpreting Osceola, 189 U.S.). 
 22. Denton, supra note 19, at 3. See, e.g., Sabella v. Brazileiro, 86 N.J.L. 505 
(1914). 
 23. So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 208 (1917). 
 24. Id. at 216–17. 
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seaward side of the pier, they were left with no remedy.25 
Congress twice attempted to cure this anomaly through legislation. In two 
separate acts, Congress expressly extended state workers’ compensation 
structures over navigable waters.26 However, the Supreme Court struck down 
both of these acts as unconstitutional usurpations of state power, as the federal 
government could not dictate the coverage applied by state-created law. 27 
Moreover, extending state statutes into maritime jurisdiction would interfere 
with the express grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government.28 
The Court reasoned that the Founders established admiralty jurisdiction 
specifically to ensure the uniformity of law required to foster free movement 
of both domestic and foreign powers upon the navigable waters.29 Allowing 
disparate legislation in waters according to state lines would destroy that 
uniformity.30 In dicta in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Company, the Court 
invited legislators to create a federal compensation structure that would not 
interfere with states’ rights or the federal admiralty jurisdiction.31 
Responding to the Court’s suggestion that “what Congress could not 
empower the States to do, it could do itself,” Congress enacted the 
LHWCA in 1927.32 By passing the LHWCA, Congress finally succeeded 
in accomplishing what it had tried to do through its earlier acts: creating a 
compensation remedy for longshoremen injured over navigable waters 
that avoided interference with state remedies.33 
                                                                                                             
 25. State Industrial Comm’n of State of New York v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 
U.S. 263, 273 (1922). 
 26. Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395 (invalidated 1920); Act of 
June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 (invalidated 1924). 
 27. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. 
W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). For a more thorough discussion of 
these Acts and cases, see Marian Mayer, Workmen’s Compensation Law in 
Louisiana 124–26 (Louisiana State University Press, 1937). 
 28. W.C. Dawson, 264 U.S. at 227 (“Without doubt Congress has power to 
alter, amend or revise the maritime law by statutes of general application 
embodying its will and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment 
of a general employers' liability law or general provisions for compensating 
injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the several States.”). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 280, 14 S. Ct. 109, 121, 
37 L. Ed. 1071 (1893). 
 30. Id. at 228 (“[T]he Union was formed with the very definite design of 
freeing maritime commerce from intolerable restrictions incident to such control. 
The subject is national. Local interest must yield to the common welfare.”). 
 31. Id. at 227. 
 32. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 216 (1969). See also 
Hearings on S. 3170 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, 31, 103 and n. 3 (1926); Hearing on H.R. 
9498 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, 
pp. 18, 119 and n. 3 (1926). 
 33. Id. 
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B. Coverage Designed to Fill the Gap 
The LHWCA created a federal no-fault system of compensation for 
longshoremen and harbor workers.34 Benefits under the Act were highly 
structured, limiting damages to pecuniary losses, including lost earnings, 
and medical and rehabilitation expenses.35 Injured workers relinquished 
claims for non-pecuniary damages such as pain and suffering in exchange 
for no-fault liability.36 
In its original form, the LHWCA only provided coverage for injuries 
occurring over navigable waters, with land-based injuries covered through 
state compensation proceedings.37 This framework evinced Congress’ sole 
intent to fill the gap in coverage created by the Jensen line.38 A worker 
injured on the deck of a ship while loading cargo could now recover for his 
resulting expenses and lost wages under the LHWCA. However, if that 
worker sustained injury while working on the loading dock, he was expected 
to seek compensation through the benefits of the state where the injury 
occurred. The LHWCA was “designed to ensure that a compensation 
remedy existed for all injuries sustained by non-seaman maritime 
employees [of statutory employers] on navigable waters, and to avoid 
uncertainty as to the source, state or federal, of that remedy.”39 
C. An Insufficient Remedy with Unforeseen Effects 
Unfortunately, the LHWCA effectively served to reduce the remedies 
available to longshoremen. The problem resulted from Congress’ specific 
incorporation of the Jensen line into the text of the LHWCA.40 While any 
covered laborer injured over navigable waters could recover benefits 
regardless of the nature of his work, laborers in the “maritime but local” 
area—the area occupied by maritime employment but still covered by state 
                                                                                                             
 34. 33 U.S.C. § 901, et. seq. (1927). See also, Denton, supra note 19, at 5. 
 35. 33 U.S.C. §§ 906–910 (2013). See also, F. Nash Bilisoly, The 
Relationship of Status and Damages in Maritime Personal Injury Cases, 72 Tul. 
L. Rev. 493, 526 (1997). 
 36. Bilisoly, supra note 35, at 526. 
 37. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 258 (1977). 
 38. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 
U.S. 297, 338 (1983) (Stevens, dissenting). The Supreme Court later expanded its 
interpretation of the LHWCA. See Davis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 
249 (1942) (acknowledging the “twilight zone” between state and federal 
compensation structures and asserting concurrent jurisdiction); Sun Ship v. 
Pennsylvania., 447 U.S. 715 (1980) (holding that the LHWCA does not supplant 
state workers’ compensation remedies, but rather supplements them). 
 39. Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114, 124 (1962). 
 40. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 220 (1969) (citing 
Davis v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 256 (1942)). 
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compensation structures—could not.41 This lack of coverage resulted from the 
1927 Act’s provision allowing compensation only if it “may not validly be 
provided by State law.”42 Therefore, injuries to longshoremen and harbor 
workers were only covered past the water’s edge. This gap in coverage was 
particularly troublesome due to the amphibious nature of the employment the 
Act sought to cover. Determination of coverage relied entirely on where the 
accident in question occurred.43 The result was a system in which workers 
were frequently “walking in and out of coverage.”44 
A number of problems stemmed from these conflicting coverage 
structures. First, a significant disparity existed between state and federal 
remedies.45 Workers injured over water received substantially better 
benefits than their counterparts with analogous injuries occurring on the 
pier. This incongruity served to “exacerbate the harshness of the already 
unpopular Jensen line.”46 Second, technological advances, like the 
containerization of cargo, moved many of the duties conducted by 
                                                                                                             
 41. Perini, 459 U.S. at 311 (citing G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of 
Admiralty 429–430 (2d ed. 1975)). As the Supreme Court explained,“[i]f the 
employment of an injured worker was determined to have no “direct relation” to 
navigation or commerce, and “the operation of local law [would not] materially 
affect” the uniformity of maritime law, then the employment would be 
characterized as “maritime but local,” and the state could provide a compensation 
remedy. If the employment could not be characterized as “maritime but local,” 
then the injured employee would be left without a compensation remedy.” Dir., 
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Perini N. River 
Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 306, 103 S. Ct. 634, 641, 74 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1983) (citing 
Grant Smith-Porter v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 477, 42 S.Ct. 157, 158, 66 L.Ed. 321 
(1922). See also Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242, 42 S.Ct. 89, 90, 
66 L.Ed. 210 (1921)). The maritime but local doctrine developed during the 
jurisdictional quagmire that followed Jensen, and was later incorporated into the 
passage of the LHWCA. See, e.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 
(1921). See also, Denton, supra note 19, at 6. 
 42. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 38 (1932). 
 43. Perini, 459 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, dissenting). 
 44. Id. See also, Clare R. Pitre, Muddy Waters—Clarifying Maritime 
Coverage Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 59 Loy. 
L. Rev. 981, 998 (2013). Justice Douglas pointed out the absurdity of this rule in 
his dissent to Nacirema, 396 U.S. at 225 (Douglas, dissenting). While the three 
workers in that case were denied LHWCA coverage because they were injured on 
the pier while loading a ship, the Court of Appeals had affirmed granting LHWCA 
benefits to the widow of a fourth injured worker in that same case. Id. That worker 
had also been struck while working on the pier, but the blow had knocked him 
into the water. Id. Since he technically died while in navigable waters, LHWCA 
applied. Id. The lesson to be learned from this result: the unlucky workers in 
Nacirema were denied coverage due to their failure to be fortuitously knocked 
into the water and drowned. 
 45. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 262 (1977) (asserting 
that state workers’ compensation benefits were inadequate). 
 46. Id. 
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longshoremen and harbor workers onshore, barring a great number of 
claims that would traditionally have been covered by the LHWCA at the 
time of its enactment.47 
Perhaps most vexing, applying the “maritime but local” doctrine 
necessitated a case-by-case assessment of which coverage system applied 
at the site of any given injury.48 With any luck, a worker who sustained 
injury over navigable waters could recover the superior benefits offered 
by the LHWCA. In contrast, if the injury occurred on the pier, that 
unfortunate worker was stuck with the subpar benefits offered by the state 
compensation statute. Further complication arose when the injury was not 
an isolated incident that occurred in a finite place. For instance, if the 
worker suffered exposure to a hazardous substance in the loading process, 
or if he injured his back in the course of a long day of unloading heavy 
cargo, where did that injury occur? It would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to say whether harm occurred on land or over water. 
As a result of this uncertainty, both employers and employees alike 
were “often required to make a perilous jurisdictional guess as to which of 
two mutually exclusive compensation schemes was applicable to cover his 
injury.”49 A claim for injury brought under the wrong system could be tied 
up in lengthy litigation, resulting at best in an untimely provision of 
benefits and expensive legal fees, and at worst in barring of the suit under 
the statute of limitations, with no recourse for recovery. Furthermore, the 
1927 construction of the LHWCA created a “twilight zone of overlapping 
jurisdiction,” wherein employers had to carry duplicative insurance 
policies to ensure their workers were covered during the entirety of their 
employment.50 
II. THE 1972 AMENDMENTS: COLORING OUTSIDE OF THE JENSEN LINE 
Prodded by the growing consternation concerning LHWCA 
application in the courts and in practice, Congress sought to cure many of 
the problems surrounding the Jensen line through amendment in 1972. The 
new legislation aimed to eliminate the risk of “walking in and out of 
coverage” borne by amphibious longshoremen and harbor workers. 
Congress had to devise an effective plan to mitigate the rigidity imposed 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. For more information on the development, implementation, and 
effects of container shipping, see John Tomlinson, History and Impact of the 
Intermodal Shipping Container, Pratt Institute (September 22, 2009), 
http://www.johntomlinson.com/docs/history_and_impact_of_shipping_container
.pdf [http://perma.cc/4WGG-NSF9]. 
 48. Perini, 459 U.S. at 307 (1983). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 339 (Stevens, dissenting). 
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by the Jensen line while maintaining the initial intent of the LHWCA to 
cover a specific class of maritime workers. With that goal in mind, 
Congress devised an expanded test to determine beneficiary eligibility. 
The new test managed to address many of the problems posed by the 1927 
Act but bore with it new and unforeseen challenges. 
A. “An Affirmative Exercise of Admiralty Jurisdiction”: Correcting 
Inconsistent Coverage 
Congress primarily intended these amendments to improve the 
LHWCA’s benefit structure. The amendments were in part a reaction to 
the prompts of the Supreme Court in Nacirema Operating Company v. 
Johnson, which affirmed the boundary of LHWCA coverage along the 
Jensen line.51 There, the Court asserted that since Congress explicitly 
chose the Jensen line in its drafting of the 1927 Act, the Court could not 
depart from that standard in determining coverage: “The invitation to 
move that line landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this 
Court.”52 
Congress responded by enacting the 1972 Amendments. In doing so, 
they embraced the argument set forth in Justice Douglas’ dissent to 
Nacirema regarding the evolution of the LHWCA: “No longer is the Act 
viewed as merely filling in the interstices around the shore line of the state 
acts, but rather as an affirmative exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.”53 
The 1972 Amendments served as a direct assertion that the “walking 
in and out of coverage” phenomenon was antithetical to the idea of the no-
                                                                                                             
 51. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4700. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 
U.S. 212, 223–24 (1969). The 1972 Amendments served two other purposes. 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698. First, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), 
the Supreme Court held the owner of a ship liable when a worker not employed 
by the owner sustained injury on board. The result was that longshoremen could 
potentially recover twice: once from their employer and once from the owner of 
the vessel. In the 1972 Amendments, Congress eliminated the strict-liability 
unseaworthiness remedy against the owner of the ship. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1972). 
Similarly, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 
(1956), the Court upheld an indemnity claim by the owner of a vessel against a 
stevedoring company when the vessel’s employee was injured as the result of the 
stevedoring company’s failure to secure cargo. Congress eliminated such 
indemnity claims in 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1972). The overriding policy in these 
amendments is that the employer of the injured claimant takes responsibility for 
compensation under the LHWCA. Further exploration of these amendments is not 
germane to the present discussion. 
 52. Nacirema, 396 U.S. at 223–24. 
 53. Id. at 224 (Douglas, dissenting) (quoting Michigan Mutual Liability Co. 
v. Arrien, D.C., 233 F.Supp. 496, 500, aff'd, 2d Cir., 344 F.2d 640). 
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fault, strict liability structure of workers’ compensation laws.54 In the 
course of hearings before the House of Representatives, one legislator 
opined, “[t]he longshoremen are the only workers in the United States who 
must worry about their injury to determine the compensation . . . . It is time 
for a Federal law for compensation for all longshoremen.”55 The House 
Report, in explaining the purpose of the legislation, asserted that 
“compensation payable to a longshoreman or a ship repairman or builder 
should not depend on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury 
occurred on land or over water.”56 
Congress highlighted the inadequacy of state benefits to underline the 
importance of changing the LHWCA.57 If injury occurred on the pier, the 
worker would be deprived of the funds necessary to effectively compensate 
him for his loss. Congress took offense at the principle that the site of an 
accident dictated radical differences in coverage for the same worker 
performing the same function.58 
B. Expanding and Constraining Coverage through a Two-Prong Test 
By amending two sections of the LHWCA, Congress converted the 
accident-situs test into a two-pronged conjunctive test, with an expanded 
situs component and a new maritime status component.59 First, Congress 
redefined “employee” in Section 902 as including “any person engaged in 
maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person 
engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a 
ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker . . . .”60 On that foundation, 
                                                                                                             
 54. Strict liability mitigated the burden of extensive litigation related to the 
precise specifics of a given injury by providing blanket coverage to workers 
injured during the course of employment. Requiring a case-by-case assessment of 
where and how a work-related injury occurred in order to determine LHWCA 
coverage directly contradicted that goal. 
 55. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, at 5. 
 56. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708. 
 57. Id. at 4707. State laws fell far short of meeting the nationally 
recommended standard of benefits under workers’ compensation structures; the 
maximum limit suggested at the time was not less than 200% of statewide average 
weekly wages. Id. 
 58. Id. at 4707–08. Congress also pointed to the effects of containerization 
and the use of LASH-type vessels moving a substantial amount of the 
longshoremen’s work onshore. Id. 
 59. As referenced in the LHWCA and other workers’ compensation statutes, 
situs refers to the physical location where an injury is incurred. 
 60. 33 U.S.C. § 902 (2013). The statute specifically excludes office clerks, 
secretaries, security personnel, data processors, individuals employed by clubs, 
camps, recreational operations, restaurants, museums or retail outlets, aquaculture 
workers, seamen, persons building, repairing or dismantling recreational vessels 
under 65 feet in length, workers engaged by a master to load or unload a small 
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Congress amended Section 903 by broadening the definition of “navigable 
waters of the United States” to “adjoining” land-based activities involving 
vessels: 
[C]ompensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of 
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or 
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters 
of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry 
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining 
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, 
repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel).61 
These amendments changed what was a strictly situs test for coverage 
eligibility to one that looks to the situs of the injury in conjunction with 
the status of the injured worker.62 The Supreme Court, in interpreting the 
                                                                                                             
vessel under 18 tons, persons employed by suppliers, transporters, or vendors and 
who are not engaged in work normally performed by the employees of the covered 
employer, and individuals employed by marinas not engaged in the construction, 
replacement, or expansion of the marina, notwithstanding routine maintenance. 
33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(a–h) (2013). Workers engaged in building repairing or 
dismantling small vessels are generally excluded, unless the employer’s facility 
receives federal maritime subsidies or if the worker is not subject to coverage 
under state workers’ compensation structures. 33 U.S.C. § 903(d)(2) (2013). 
Finally, employees of the United States, any agency of the United States, or a state 
or foreign government or any subdivision thereof are excluded from coverage. 33 
U.S.C. § 903(b) (2013). The Benefits Review Board has defined the category of 
coverage to harbor-workers as including employees directly involved in the 
alteration, maintenance, repair, or construction of harbor facilities. Stewart v. 
Brown & Root, Inc., 7 BRBS 356 (1978). Harbor facilities include piers, docks, 
wharves, and adjacent areas used in the loading, unloading, repair, or construction 
of vessels. Id. 
 61. 33 U.S.C. § 903 (2013). Theoretically the employer must also meet the 
statutory definition of a qualified employer, though the courts question how 
strictly this requirement applies. Cf. Hullinghorst Industries, Inc. v. Carroll, 650 
F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini 
North River Associates, 103 S. Ct. 634 (1983). See also, Denton, supra note 19, 
at 11. Further exploration of this issue is outside the scope of this comment. 
 62. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264–65 (1977). Note 
that a current split exists among the circuits related to the interpretation of 
“adjoining land” with regard to the situs requirement. Some circuits have 
determined that adjoining land means any area near water. See Brady-Hamilton 
Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1978), and Sea–Land Service, 
Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir.1976). 
Others have found that injury must occur on a situs directly contiguous with 
navigable waters. See New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker's 
Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 394 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (overturning 
Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)), 
and Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995). While 
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two prongs used in this new test, indicated that the status and situs 
requirements, “while separate and distinct, should not be read to render the 
other superfluous.”63 Status and situs do not overlap to the point that they 
merge into one, but rather remain two independent, conjunctive 
requirements for determining coverage.64 
Although these amendments sought to remedy the problem of workers 
walking in and out of coverage by extending coverage onto “adjoining 
lands,” it was not Congress’ intention to cover “all those who breathe salt 
air.”65 Rather, “[t]he expansion of the definition of navigable waters to 
include rather large shore-side areas necessitated an affirmative 
description of the particular employees working in those areas who would 
be covered. This was the function of the maritime employment 
requirement.”66 
The legislative history confirms the conjunctive independence of the 
two prongs, as evidenced in the Report by the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, which delineates the exclusion of non-maritime 
workers injured in the loading area: 
The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not 
engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just 
because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters 
used for such activity. Thus, employees whose responsibility is 
only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment would not 
be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs do 
not require them to participate in the loading or unloading of 
cargo. However, checkers, for example, who are directly involved 
in the loading or unloading functions are covered by the new 
amendment.67 
The Supreme Court interpreted this comment to mean that Congress 
intended status to define the scope of the newly extended landward 
coverage.68 
The addition of the status requirement particularly limited coverage of 
land-based injuries incorporated by the new situs requirement. Congress 
did not intend to deprive workers on the other side of the Jensen line of a 
                                                                                                             
this circuit split awaits determination by the Supreme Court, it is the subject of 
another paper altogether. 
 63. Bilisoly, supra note 35, at 518 (citing Herb's Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 
414 (1985); Perini, 459 U.S. (1983)). 
 64. Herb's Welding, 470 U.S. at 426. 
 65. Id. at 450. 
 66. Id. at 423. 
 67. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708; H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, 11 (1972). 
 68. Perini, 459 U.S. at 317–18. 
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remedy to which they would have otherwise had access under the original 
LHWCA.69 The purpose of the amendments was, after all, to “extend 
coverage to protect additional workers.”70 Still, the limited nature of that 
extension was clear. 
C. New Ambiguities Create an Unforeseen Burden 
The implementation of the status requirement created new 
ambiguities. Particularly, the 1972 Amendments failed to establish 
sufficiently clear jurisdictional lines, and thus, confusion abounded as to 
where federal jurisdiction ended and state jurisdiction began.71 This new 
uncertainty led to a flood of expensive litigation that many in the industry 
deemed unnecessary and unfair.72 
The expansion of coverage predictably resulted in a substantial influx 
of LHWCA claims, which proved to be costly for employers liable under 
the Act.73 In 1978, LHWCA costs relative to payroll were more than 
double those in other industries such as manufacturing, carpentry, foundry, 
and logging.74 Expenses rose to 50% of total payroll costs, a staggering 
number in comparison to the American average of 1.5%.75 The increased 
burden imposed by the new amendments led many shippers to divert cargo 
outside the United States in an effort to avoid LHWCA-related costs.76 A 
Department of Commerce study reported that 7.4 million tons of cargo 
were diverted to Canada between 1976 and 1979, resulting in a loss of $9.4 
billion to the American economy.77 In the end, this exodus out of the 
American market created an overall loss of jobs for American workers, 
lost profits for their employers, and a hit to the national economy.78 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. at 324 (establishing that LHWCA applies when a worker is injured on 
navigable waters). 
 70. Id. at 316–17. 
 71. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, at 5 (statement of Don Nickles, Senator of 
Oklahoma). 
 72. Id. 
 73. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, fig.14 (US Dep’t of Labor, Increase in 
Claims and Benefit Levels Since 1972 Amendments to the Longshore Act). 
Between 1972 and 1977, injuries reported under the Act increased by 185%, 
jumping from 72,000 to 205,000 per year. Id. 
 74. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, fig. 16 (US Dep’t of Labor, Final Report on 
the Interagency Task Force on Workplace Safety and Health (December 14, 1978)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, fig.16 (US Dep’t of Commerce, Longshore 
Cost Promotes Diversion of U.S. Cargo). 
 77. Id. 
 78. One shipyard reported costs jumping from twenty percent to sixty 
percent; under duress, the company “literally and figuratively packed their bags 
and left Brooklyn.” 1981 Hearing, supra note 13, at 27 (statement of William L. 
Gardner, representative of Braswell Shipyards, Inc.). In 1981, a bill was 
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III. THE SUPREME COURT ATTEMPTS TO MAKE SENSE OF THE STATUS TEST 
Immediately following the 1972 Amendments, confusion arose as to 
what exactly “in the course of maritime employment” meant. In the years 
that followed, the Supreme Court did substantial work in establishing clear 
guidelines for judges and industry participants alike in defining the 
maritime employment status test.79 
First, the Court focused on the loading and unloading of cargo from a 
vessel as the touchstone of maritime employment conducted on land.80 The 
Court defined the unloading process as “taking cargo out of the hold, 
moving it away from the ship’s side, and carrying it immediately to a 
storage or holding area.”81 Accordingly, workers injured on the situs but 
not involved in the overall process of loading and unloading ships were 
not covered.82 The Court rejected the “point of rest” theory proffered by 
the petitioners in Northeast Marine Terminal v. Caputo.83 While 
petitioners argued that the loading process terminated as soon as cargo 
landed on the pier, the Court found that this theory construed the definition 
of loading and unloading too narrowly.84 Still, maritime unloading 
required some “nexus with a vessel.”85 
Next, the Court reiterated the importance of keeping the status and 
situs requirements distinct. In P.C. Pfeiffer Company v. Ford, the Court 
determined that the scope of the status test included “any worker who 
moves cargo between ship and land transportation,” reasoning that such a 
definition provided consistency and predictability for interpretation of the 
status requirement.86 The holding in Pfeiffer comported with congressional 
intent by focusing narrowly on the nature of the employment in assessing 
status, rather than commingling status and situs in a single inquiry.87 
                                                                                                             
introduced proposing to address these problems by amending the LHWCA. The 
proposed amendment would delete the independent status and situs requirements 
and instead employ a definition of status as incorporating both job activity and 
location the time of injury. The bill, however, failed to pass. Longshoremen’s and 
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments, S. 1182, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(May 14, 1981). 
 79. Kenneth G. Engerrand, LHWCA Coverage After New Orleans Depot 
Services, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Twelfth Judge Alvin 
B. Rubin Conference on Maritime Personal Injury Law 57 (April 11, 2014). 
 80. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977). 
 81. Id. at 266–67. 
 82. Id. at 267. 
 83. Id. at 277–78. 
 84. Id. 
 85. BPU Mgmt., Inc/Sherwin Alumina Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. 
Programs, 732 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2013) (interpreting Caputo, 432 U.S. at 267). 
 86. See P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 83–84 (1979). 
 87. See id. at 83. 
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Moreover, the decision refrained from extending coverage to every worker 
occupying the maritime situs, and thus retained the integrity of both status 
and situs as individual inquiries.88 Further emphasizing this principle, in 
Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, the Court reiterated the notion that the status 
inquiry embodies an occupational test.89 Coverage could not be extended 
to a laborer just because his place of work was an inherently maritime 
location; the worker had to also be engaged in traditionally maritime 
employment—duties conventionally relegated to longshoremen and 
harbor workers.90 
The Court issued its last clarification on the status requirement to date 
in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb.91 In Schwalb, the claimants 
participated in the loading process solely by performing repair and 
maintenance services on loading equipment.92 The Court ruled that injuries 
incurred during the repair and maintenance of equipment were covered by 
the LHWCA, as long as they were integral to the loading and unloading 
process.93 According to the Court: 
Someone who repairs or maintains a piece of loading equipment 
is just as vital to and an integral part of the loading process as the 
operator of the equipment. When machinery breaks down or 
becomes clogged or fouled because of the lack of cleaning, the 
loading process stops until the difficulty is cured.94 
Neither the absence of the worker’s continuous participation in 
loading, nor the sporadic nature of the repair and maintenance, gave the 
Court pause.95 
The notion that a worker qualifies as a maritime employee when he 
provides services essential to—but not directly involved in—the loading 
process blurs the boundaries around the status test and muddies its 
relationship to situs. It reopens ambiguities as to the scope of coverage, 
threatens to consume most, if not all, of the exclusion of non-maritime 
workers, and simply shifts the status inquiry to a determination of how 
close or detached the non-loading function may be to the loading function. 
Essentially, it creates a sliding spectrum with no fixed point separating 
LHWCA coverage from non-coverage. 
                                                                                                             
 88. See id. 
 89. 470 U.S. 414, 424 (1985) (denying LHWCA coverage to a welder on a 
stationary drilling platform located in state territorial waters). 
 90. Id. at 425,26. 
 91. 493 U.S. 40 (1989). 
 92. Id. at 46. 
 93. Id. at 47. 
 94. 493 U.S. 40, 47 (1989). 
 95. Id. 
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IV. TIME MARCHES ON: A TEST DEVOID OF TEMPORALITY 
A piece of cargo must pass through many hands in order to travel from 
a factory in Asia to a warehouse in New Orleans. Days, upon weeks, upon 
months of work must be accomplished in order to make its voyage 
possible. But not every worker who lifts a hammer in furtherance of the 
cargo’s journey does so in the scope of maritime employment. Likewise, 
not every task that facilitates the loading and unloading of cargo in a port 
should be covered by the LHWCA. For example, a worker who fits a pipe 
on a barren lot that will be used to load oil onto a tanker in five years time 
should not be considered to be engaged in maritime employment, even if 
that lot was at one point a loading dock, and one day will be again. Of 
course, without this task completed, loading could not be accomplished. 
However, status under the LHWCA is not a but-for test.96 The Act never 
intended compensation to reach a worker of this sort who was not engaged 
in traditional longshoring activities, and extending coverage to him and 
other workers in similar positions leads to absurd results and an 
unacceptable strain on the industry by inflating its financial liabilities to 
otherwise ineligible workers. 
A. The Subtle Incorporation of Temporal Considerations in Supreme 
Court Precedent 
While Caputo rejected the point of rest theory, the Court characterized 
a qualified worker participating in the loading process as one who carried 
cargo “immediately . . . to a storage or holding area.”97 Caputo borrows 
this language directly from the House Report on the 1972 Amendments.98 
There, Congress emphasized that “cargo, whether in break bulk or 
containerized form, is typically unloaded from the ship and immediately 
transported to a storage or holding area on the pier, wharf, or terminal 
adjoining navigable waters.”99 The use of the word “immediately” 
suggests that Congress intended for timing to play a role in determining 
whether a worker is functioning in the course of maritime employment 
when facilitating the loading and unloading of a vessel. While the point of 
rest theory proffered by the petitioners in Caputo may not be the 
appropriate test, a line must be drawn somewhere. 
                                                                                                             
 96. New Orleans Depot Servs. v. Dir., Office of Worker's Comp. Programs, 
718 F.3d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Clement, J., concurring). 
 97. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 266–67 (1977) 
(emphasis added). 
 98. See 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708. 
 99. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, P.C. Pfeiffer asserted a limitation on the temporal 
attenuation of the connection between the vessel and loading with regards 
to the status inquiry. In keeping with congressional intent, the Court was 
careful not to extend coverage to every worker within the situs area.100 The 
Court emphatically stated, “neither the driver of the truck carrying cotton 
to Galveston nor the locomotive engineer transporting military vehicles 
from Beaumont was engaged in maritime employment even though he was 
working on the marine situs.”101 A person integral to loading, but only by 
means of furthering terrestrial shipment of cargo, did not possess sufficient 
ties to the loading process to satisfy the status test.102 The Court 
acknowledged the absurdity of attenuating the connection between the 
employee and the vessel.103 This connection implicitly requires that the 
ship and laborer occupy roughly the same space at the same time. In other 
words, a worker needs to be actively engaged in the loading of vessels to 
be considered a maritime worker. 
The success of loading and unloading operations must turn on the 
worker effectively carrying out his duties. This understanding of maritime 
employment is illustrated in the Schwalb opinion, where the Court 
emphasized that the loading and unloading process actually stopped for 
repairs and that the employee’s supervisor urged the worker to hurry up so 
that loading might continue.104 “The determinative consideration,” the 
Court asserted, “is that the ship loading process could not continue unless 
the retarder that [the machinist] worked on was operating properly.”105 In 
so ruling, the Court implied that the maintenance and repair of the 
equipment must be directly and temporally connected to the actual 
cessation of a specified loading or unloading task. Because the Court cites 
this temporality consideration as determinative, it should not be 
considered dicta, but rather incorporated into the status analysis. 
B. Circuit Courts Watch the Clock 
Judges in the lower courts have acknowledged the role of temporality 
in assessing status eligibility and established jurisprudential support for a 
                                                                                                             
 100. P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 83 (1979). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. Cf. Boudloche v. Howard Trucking Co. 632 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980), 
(extending LHWCA coverage to a driver who loaded cargo onto the ship five 
percent of the time). Carrying cargo from the ship to land-based transportation 
constitutes maritime employment, whereas simply driving the vehicle involved in 
further transportation does not. 
 103. Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 83. 
 104. Schwalb, 493 U.S. at 48. 
 105. Id. 
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reading of Schwalb that requires immediacy.106 This position is perhaps 
most explicitly and eloquently explained in the concurrence offered by 
Judge Clement in New Orleans Depot Services v. Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs.107 
In her concurring opinion, Judge Clement asserts that the original New 
Orleans Depot panel misread Schwalb, cutting it off from its roots.108 
Schwalb turned on the fact that workers conducting repair and 
maintenance participate in the loading process “because the actual process, 
once begun, would be arrested in the absence of their contributions.”109 
According to Judge Clement, the panel erred because Schwalb does not 
demand that 
all employees who repair any equipment that may be used in the 
loading process are similarly integral. If this were the inquiry, it 
would only be a short step to the conclusion that a manufacturer 
of shoes or walkie talkies should be covered, because, arguably, 
the modern loading process cannot be accomplished without those 
items.110 
Judge Clement pointed out the error in interpreting the LHWCA as 
providing a but-for status test by highlighting the absurdity of the temporal 
attenuation it would cause.111 Instead, the inquiry should look to the duties 
of a traditional longshoreman in loading and unloading a vessel. For 
example, repairing his own tools would qualify a longshoreman for 
                                                                                                             
 106. See generally New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker's 
Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Sidwell v. Va. Int'l 
Terminals, Inc., 372 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2004); In re Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 592 F.3d 
907 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 107. New Orleans Depot, 718 F.3d at 394–99 (Clement, concurring). The 
majority opinion in New Orleans Depot was decided based on a failure to meet the 
situs requirement, overturning the long-standing test set forth in Texports Stevedore 
Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 518 (5th Cir. 1980). Id. at 394. In her concurrence, 
Judge Clement suggested that her opinion was not dictum, but rather binding as an 
alternative holding. Id. at 394 (Clement, J. concurring). Her assertion was incorrect, 
as Judge Clement failed to achieve a majority by one vote. Id. 
 108. Id. at 396. The en banc decision in New Orleans Depot overturned the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals earlier decision that held that a container repairman 
operating at a site detached from the loading site met both the status and situs 
requirements under the LHWCA. New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office 
of Worker's Comp. Programs, 689 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 2012) reh'g en banc 
granted sub nom. 
 109. New Orleans Depot, 718 F.3d at 396 (emphasis added). The Fourth 
Circuit expressed a similar reading in Sidwell, 372 F.3d at 243 (arguing that the 
standard proposed in Schwalb that the loading process could not continue “makes 
the capacity to interrupt ongoing long-shoring activities paramount.”). 
 110. New Orleans Depot, 718 F.3d at 396 (Clement, concurring). 
 111. Id. 
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coverage, but repairing a shipping container not necessarily destined for a 
vessel would not.112 While containers may affect the loading and 
unloading process, their repair is not within the customary duties of 
longshoremen.113 Rather, satisfaction of the status test requires that repair 
or maintenance of equipment be “one step in the direct chain of unloading 
a ship . . . when ‘the maintenance men would [halt] the entire loading 
process’ if they were not available for the repair.”114 In the New Orleans 
Depot concurrence, Judge Clement argued that, where a welder repaired 
containers that may have been destined for shipping, but had never even 
witnessed a vessel being loaded, much less assisted in the process, no 
coverage could be provided due to his lack of status as a maritime 
worker.115 Such a worker was “a far cry from the paradigmatic 
longshoreman who walked in and out of coverage during his workday.”116 
Shortly after New Orleans Depot, a panel of Fifth Circuit jurists 
seemed to endorse Judge Clement’s view on the status test. In BPU 
Management/Sherwin Alumina Company v. Director, Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs, the court found that a worker injured while 
cleaning a cross-tunnel in a bauxite production facility did not qualify for 
coverage under the LHWCA.117 The court held that cleaning the tunnel 
was not integral to loading and unloading in spite of the fact that, if the 
tunnel filled up, loading and unloading would have to stop.118 Because it 
would have taken an excessively long time for the tunnel to fill up 
substantially enough to interfere with loading, the court reasoned that 
cleaning the tunnel could not be viewed as part of the direct chain of 
loading and unloading a vessel.119 Further, the facility stockpiled bauxite 
for years, so its storage on the site could hardly be defined as a step in the 
loading process.120 The underlying implication of this analysis is that some 
expiration date exists in applying the status test to activities facilitating 
loading and unloading. 
Not every activity that facilitates the eventual shipping of cargo over 
navigable waters is maritime in nature. Improper application of the status 
test threatens to bring about that absurd result. The Eighth Circuit resisted 
this overly broad interpretation of Schwalb in In re Norfolk Southern 
                                                                                                             
 112. See id. at 396–97. 
 113. Id. The customary duties Judge Clement refers to are undoubtedly the 
actual physical loading and unloading of the vessel. 
 114. Id. at 397 (citing Sea–Land Serv., Inc. v. Rock, 953 F.2d 56, 67 (3d 
Cir.1992)). 
 115. Id. at 397–98. 
 116. Id.(citing Herb's Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 427 (1985)). 
 117. 732 F.3d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 464. 
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Railway Company.121 In that case, the court refused coverage to workers 
who switched railroad cars full of coal onto the correct tracks to deliver 
them to the dumpers that would be used to load the coal onto ships.122 
Because the claimants worked with the cars before the loading process 
began and did not initiate their descent to the coal dumpers, the court found 
that their tasks were not sufficiently linked to the loading process.123 It was 
not enough that their activities were generally essential to shipping the 
cargo; rather, to be covered under LHWCA, workers’ activities must have 
a direct nexus with actually loading the vessel.124 
C. The Benefits Review Board Starts Keeping Time 
Decisions issued by the Benefits Review Board (BRB), the 
administrative tribunal adjudicating LHWCA claims, have drawn several 
time-based distinctions related to the status inquiry.125 First, the Board 
distinguished the difference between present and future involvement in 
maritime activities; it is not enough to establish that work contributes to 
some function that will, at some point in the future, be involved in loading 
and unloading cargo.126 Instead, to qualify as a maritime employee, a 
laborer’s duties must be directly associated with contemporaneous loading 
and unloading. In conducting this future/present analysis, the BRB has 
taken into account the transitory nature of employment. Specifically, 
                                                                                                             
 121. 592 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Congress created the Benefits Review Board in 1972 to adjudicate 
appeals of administrative judges’ decisions related to claims arising under the 
LHWCA and the Black Lung Benefits amendments to the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Benefits Review Board 
Mission Statement, www.dol.gov/brb/mission.htm (last visited October 9, 2014). 
The Board consists of five members appointed by the Secretary of Labor. Id. BRB 
decisions can be appealed to the circuit court in the circuit where the injury 
occurred. Id. Courts generally show no deference to BRB decisions; these cases 
represent a trend in the industry that needs to be taken up by the courts. 
 126. See, e.g., Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc. v. Prevetire, 27 F.3d 985, 
989–90 (4th Cir. 1994) (where a pipe fitter injured while building a power plant 
was not within maritime employment when his only connection to maritime 
activity was the fact that energy from the power plant he helped build would 
eventually be used by a shipyard); Moon v. Tidewater Constr. Co., 35 BRBS 151 
(2001) (where construction of a building that would be used as a storage facility 
in the future was not uniquely maritime employment). Cf. Kerby v. Southeastern 
Public Service Authority, 31 BRBS 6 (1997), aff’d mem., 135 F.3d 770 (4th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 816 (1998) (where workers at a power plant that 
provided power to a shipyard were found to be involved in maritime employment 
because the maintenance and repair was integral to the loading and unloading 
process). 
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where a claimant’s relationship to a maritime facility is temporary or time-
limited, LHWCA coverage is not appropriate, even if his work may further 
the loading and unloading of vessels in the future.127 This qualification 
rests on the understanding that the employee will not be present when the 
actual loading and unloading necessary to confer status occurs.128 
Second, the BRB has emphasized the importance of some temporal 
nexus with the vessel to satisfy the status test. While it is not necessary 
that a worker actually handle cargo, some nexus must exist between their 
activities and the actual loading of the ship.129 Case law and administrative 
proceedings like these illuminate the need to connect the status 
requirement with a finite place in time in order to clearly and reasonably 
delineate boundaries to LHWCA coverage. 
V. ADDRESSING STATUS AMBIGUITY THROUGH TEMPORAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
Tension exists between a broad definition of maritime labor that 
includes all those activities integral to loading and unloading and a tighter 
definition of maritime labor that relies on the immediacy referred to in 
Caputo and Schwalb. Resolving this tension is crucial to establishing a 
compensation structure that benefits laborers, employers, and the industry 
as a whole. In order to determine an appropriate application of the status 
test, statutory language, congressional intent, and policy concerns must be 
considered. Doing so will lead to an interpretation of status that is narrower 
than blanket coverage yet broad enough to incorporate all deserving 
parties. A legislative revision drafted with these goals in mind will best 
serve the viability of LHWCA compensation in the future. 
Notwithstanding congressional action, a just remedy to the problem of 
status may be accorded through appropriate judicial and practical 
application of the current Act. 
                                                                                                             
 127. Southcombe v. A Mark, B Mark, C Mark Corp., 37 BRBS 169 (2003) 
(where a claimant involved in the construction of a facility that would have future 
maritime use was not covered because his relationship to the facility was 
temporary, lasting only until construction was completed). 
 128. Balonek v. Texcom, Inc., 43 BRBS 153 (2009) (finding claimant’s 
temporary presence at the shipyard was not covered, even though the cable system 
he installed would later be used in maritime functions: Future use cannot confer 
coverage). 
 129. Terlemezian v. J.H. Reid General Contracting, 37 BRBS 112 (2003) 
(holding that no nexus existed between a road project to improve land 
transportation at a shipping facility and the actual task of loading the ship); cf. 
Ruffin v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 36 BRBS 52 (2002) 
(providing coverage to a worker injured while loading machinery was in operation 
and the claimant had to wear a hard hat and safety goggles). 
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A. Temporality Imposes Boundaries that Congress Intended 
Congressional intent regarding status has been misconstrued, resulting 
in an erroneous application of the LHWCA statute. Based on the idea that 
Congress intended to expand—not limit—coverage through the 1972 
Amendments, scholars have advocated for a broad reading of the two-
pronged test. According to one such scholar, “[t]he Benefits Review Board 
has embarked on a slippery road of analyzing shipyard workers status by 
creating a new test for coverage instead of relying on the statutory 
language.”130 Under his theory, the overarching intent of the Act was to 
resolve jurisdictional anomalies by expanding coverage.131 
While it is true that Congress intended to expand coverage under the 
1972 Amendments, this reading is overly simplistic. To read the statute 
accordingly conflates the status and situs tests. The amended situs test 
indeed intended to expand coverage; therefore, in analyzing the situs 
requirement, a broad interpretation may be appropriate.132 Status, 
however, served the function of a limiting clause. As such, it follows that 
the status requirement should be read narrowly. As Justice Stevens 
proffered in his Perini dissent, “[in] this statute, the subcategories—
longshoremen and harbor workers—are both described in detail, and no 
other subcategory is even mentioned, giving rise to an especially strong 
inference that Congress intended a snug fit between ‘maritime 
employment’ and the two subcategories.”133 The incorporation of the 
status test into the 1972 Amendments meant to rein in the expansion of 
situs; this “snug fit,” therefore, seems a more appropriate interpretation. 
To stay true to congressional intent, courts need only look to the plain 
language of the statute. The Act states that maritime employment is related 
to traditional longshoring tasks, like loading and unloading. No reason 
exists to read more into that definition than what the words plainly state. 
Elucidating a trend toward strict construction within the Fifth Circuit, 
noted scholar Kenneth Engerrand explained, “[t]he full court has 
expressed its intent to apply the LHWCA as written, and not to give liberal 
construction that departs from the plain language of the Act . . . and 
continues the Fifth Circuit’s course toward rejection of policy arguments 
                                                                                                             
 130. Thomas C. Fitzhugh III, Who Is Covered? Recent Cases Regarding 
Longshore Situs and Status, 16 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 265, 279–80 (2004). 
 131. Id. at 318. 
 132. Alternatively, the expansion of situs over land might be best interpreted 
as a jurisdictional gap-filler. No arguments regarding the appropriate means of 
situs analysis are asserted here. 
 133. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 
U.S. 297, 327 (1983) (Stevens, dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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proffered to circumvent the plain language in the LHWCA.”134 This trend 
in the Fifth Circuit flows from the Supreme Court’s assertion of “the basic 
and unexceptional rule that courts must give effect to the clear meaning of 
statutes as written.”135 Reading the status requirement in an overly broad 
manner exceeds the scope of the actual language of the LHWCA. Such a 
reading unduly favors the policy interest of expanding coverage, while 
failing to give substantial credence to the actual language and intent of 
Congress in enacting the statute. 
B. Prioritizing the Wrong Policy: Predictability Trumps Expanded 
Coverage 
If any policy is to be favored over the statutory language, it is not the 
predisposition towards expanded coverage. Upholding a policy of 
expansion ignores an even more important policy concern: that of 
predictability and uniformity of coverage. The LHWCA (or any other 
workers’ compensation system, for that matter) is rendered useless without 
predictability. History has shown that “[m]ore than perhaps any other 
statutory scheme, a worker’s compensation statute should be geared 
toward a non-litigious, speedy, sure resolution of the compensation claims 
of injured workers.”136 A framework that facilitates the predictability and 
uniform application of that coverage benefits all parties across the 
spectrum. 
First, it is axiomatic that, in the case of injury, a worker is best served 
by receiving benefits in a timely fashion. The principal purpose of 
workers’ compensation is to provide support to a worker who loses wages 
and incurs medical expenses as a result of injury in the workplace. Such 
support cannot be provided, nor can those expenses be compensated, if 
disputes over coverage keep a claim tied up in court for years. 
Second, employers benefit from the speedy and efficient resolution of 
claims. An employer bears the onerous costs of litigation for claims that 
are disputed throughout the administrative and judicial systems. Providing 
clear workers’ compensation benefits allows an employer to maintain a 
satisfied and protected workforce, control costs of production, and avoid 
exorbitant litigation costs. 
                                                                                                             
 134. Engerrand, supra note 79, at 60. 
 135. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992). 
 136. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 518 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting), overruled by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., 
Office of Worker's Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The 
majority in New Orleans Depot agreed with this premise, stating, “One could 
hardly imagine an area where predictability is more important.” 718 F.3d at 394. 
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Finally, predictability of coverage serves a broader economic interest 
in a workers’ compensation system: 
The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is 
expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of 
commerce in the form of increased price until it is spread in 
dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each 
competing unit in a given industry is uniformly affected, no 
producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer 
any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the 
compensation principle.137 
The distribution of burden across the industry absorbs harm to 
individual employers, and in turn, the economy. When this balance is 
disturbed by inconsistencies in coverage and liability, the result is 
detrimental to individual business owners and the industry as a whole. 
Furthermore, uncertainty regarding application of the LHWCA leads to 
increased costs related to resolution of claims, which in turn leads to 
increased production costs. These costs eventually trickle down to the 
consumer. 
C. Improving Section 902 through Revision Incorporating Temporality 
Concerns related to predictability and uniformity in LHWCA 
application may easily be addressed by a simple statutory revision. 
Activities related to the loading and unloading of vessels should be part of 
a direct chain. As such, Congress should amend the LHWCA to redefine 
the definition of employee in Section 902 to read: 
The term ‘employee’ means any person engaged in maritime 
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged 
in longshoring operations, insofar as their duties are conducted in 
the course of, and are necessary to, the direct loading and 
unloading of cargo onto a vessel, and any harbor-worker including 
a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker . . . .138 
This solution suggests grafting the language employed in state 
workers’ compensation statutes onto the employee definition to achieve a 
targeted timing nexus. In other state workers’ compensation statutes, “in 
the course of” generally denotes a requisite closeness between a worker’s 
                                                                                                             
 137. Malone, supra note 19, at 34–35. 
 138. See 33 U.S.C. § 902 (2013) (emphasized language added). 
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injury and employment.139 Here, the same language is incorporated to 
impose a similarly close relationship between the activities of the worker 
and the actual loading and unloading process.140 The language narrows 
coverage in regards to a point in time and space.141 Still, it provides a 
cushion so as to prevent a caustic application of coverage: “A reasonable 
time is allowed before and after the assumption of duties, especially when 
the employee is on the premises either preparing for work or leaving it.”142 
Requiring that longshoring activities be done in the course of loading 
or unloading a vessel creates a direct and temporal link to the actual 
process. It prevents an overly attenuated extension of coverage to workers, 
while keeping in line with the cessation of loading described in Schwalb. 
The new language clarifies application of the statute. It reads the Act 
narrowly enough to prevent over-coverage that could be harmful to 
workers and the industry alike, while still allowing for enough flexibility 
to continue providing coverage to workers outside actual loading and 
unloading duties, such as maintenance and repair integral to the immediate 
loading process. Revising the text thus inserts the necessary temporal 
immediacy suggested by the courts since the 1972 Amendments. 
                                                                                                             
 139. See generally, Stewart v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 13-193 (La. App. 5 Cir. 
10/9/13), 128 So. 3d 398, 405 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (“The requirement that an 
employee's injury occur “in the course of” employment focuses on the time and 
place relationship between the injury and the employment.”); Martin v. Applied 
Cellular Tech., Inc., 284 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002) (asserting “[T]hat the injury 
arose in the course of employment by demonstrating that (A) it occurred within 
the boundaries of time and space created by the terms of employment; and (B) it 
occurred in the performance of an activity . . . if reasonably expected and not 
forbidden, or an activity of mutual benefit to employer and employee.”); Crowe 
v. Blum, 9 F.3d 32, 34 (7th Cir. 1993) (“An injury occurs “in the course” of 
employment if the time, place and circumstances indicate that it was suffered 
while the injured employee was furthering the ends of the employer.”). 
 140. This requirement would only apply to assessing whether the general 
duties of a worker throughout the course of his employment were maritime in 
nature; it should not be read so congruently with state remedies to assume that the 
worker must actually be injured while carrying out these duties. Rather, such 
duties must simply make up a substantial part of his work responsibilities. To read 
otherwise would simply create a new system in which workers would 
continuously walk in and out of coverage. 
 141. Mayer, supra note 27, at 56. 
 142. Id. See, e.g., Sanders v. Kirby, 171 So. 2d 281, 284 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1965) 
(awarding workers’ compensation for a worker injured on the job site while 
preparing to begin work in ten minutes and discussing the tasks of the day with 
his supervisor). Cf. Tarver v. Energy Drilling Co. 645 So.2d 796 (La. App. 2 Cir. 
1994) (denying workers’ compensation to an employee injured in a car accident 
while travelling from the work site to a temporary employee housing unit 
provided by his employer). 
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1. Familiar Terms of Art Foster Ease of Application in the Courts 
As courts are accustomed to applying the language associated in 
this statutory revision in other workers’ compensation claims, judges 
should not have difficulty applying the new LHWCA amendment. 
Interpretation of the term “in the course of” would employ the same 
standard exercised in state workers’ compensation adjudications; only 
here it would be used in relation to the loading and unloading of ships. 
A critical analysis of the proposed legislation identifies only two 
potential pitfalls associated with the amendment: myopia and the 
incentivization of inaction. These weaknesses, however, are not 
inherent to the actual letter of the law, but instead result from a 
wrongful interpretation of the amended language. 
First, a myopic reading of the new language risks construction that 
is too narrow, thus excluding a class of workers that might otherwise 
be covered under the superior benefits of the LHWCA. After all, are 
there not other tasks completed by maritime workers that are not 
directly related to the loading and unloading of the vessel? 
Additionally, what if a worker does load and unload vessels, but is 
injured while conducting some other duty? 
The answer to this problem of judicial tunnel vision is two-fold. 
First, the plain text of the LHWCA accounts for most of these other 
various jobs in different, unrevised sections of the Act.143 Second, the 
newly revised language of the statute does not necessitate an evaluation 
of the activity of the worker at the moment of his injury to determine 
coverage. To read the language as such would wrongly conflate the use 
of the language in the state statutes with its use and purpose here. In 
state statutes “in the course of” describes what one is doing at the time 
of injury, while in the proposed revision, “in the course of” defines 
what duties are part of maritime employment in general. Once it is 
established that a worker’s employment qualifies as maritime based on 
duties conducted in the course of loading and unloading a vessel, he 
will be eligible for the LHWCA. If he is completing some other task at 
the moment he is injured, it is of no concern; he is nonetheless a 
maritime employee.144 In other words, if a worker’s duties involve a 
                                                                                                             
 143. 33 USCS § 902 (“any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, 
shipbuilder, and ship-breaker”); 33 USCS § 903 (“repairing, dismantling, or 
building a vessel”). 
 144. To illustrate this point, a worker whose primary responsibility is to load 
cargo on a ship would still be covered, even if he were sweeping out a storage 
container on a covered situs when he was injured. He was injured in the course of 
his employment, and his employment is maritime in nature. His employment is 
maritime in nature because his duties generally are conducted in the course of 
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tight temporal connection with the loading of a ship, then his job 
description is “maritime employee.” Once that status attaches, he 
remains a maritime employee throughout the course of his workday, 
regardless of his particular actions at the time of injury. 
Judge Higginson focused upon the second pitfall of tight 
temporality in his dissent to New Orleans Depot.145 The problem arises 
from a reading of Schwalb that denies coverage to workers repairing 
and maintaining equipment unless loading is interrupted for the repair. 
Judge Higginson argued that such a rule would foster inefficiency in 
the industry by incentivizing reactivity.146 Instead of being proactive 
and keeping equipment in good running order, workers would prefer to 
wait until equipment breaks so that the loading process is interrupted 
and coverage is ensured. The statutory revision here avoids that strange 
result by allowing some flexibility in temporality. Adding “in the 
course of” to the statute creates a cushion of time on either side of the 
loading and unloading processes, during which repairs could 
reasonably be made and still be covered under the LHWCA. Still, that 
cushion is a small one—it would not be allowed to extend maritime 
status beyond those repairs immediately necessary to loading and 
unloading.147 Put simply, repair and maintenance must be done to 
facilitate the actual task of loading or unloading a particular vessel. 
An appropriate reading of the proposed statutory language avoids 
these pitfalls while allowing for a time-limited application of the status 
requirement. Because this proposed amendment is familiar language to 
judges, its application should be straightforward and consistent, as long 
as it is appropriately interpreted to modify the assessment of 
employment status and not read so constrictively as to torpedo efficient 
operations. 
                                                                                                             
loading and unloading vessels; the fact that he was not loading the ship at the time 
of injury is irrelevant. 
 145. Judge Higginson decried Judge Clement’s concurrence because her 
application prevented workers who kept machines running smoothly from 
receiving benefits. New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker's 
Comp. Programs 718 F.3d 384, 404 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Higginson, 
dissenting). According to Judge Higginson, under Judge Clement’s reading of 
Schwalb, workers would have to wait for machinery to break before fixing it to 
meet the tight temporal construct Clement suggested. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. For example, in a traditional state workers’ compensation case, an 
employee may be considered “in the course of” employment when he is preparing 
his tools before beginning his duties, but he is not “in the course of” his 
employment when he is brushing his teeth in the morning and readying for work. 
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2. No Time to Wait: Addressing the Harms of Unbounded 
Temporality Today 
Revising the LHWCA status requirement to incorporate a temporal 
element is the ideal solution to the problem of determining coverage 
for injured maritime workers. Realistically, however, a statutory 
revision does not appear to be looming on the horizon—the LHWCA has 
only been amended twice in its almost ninety year history.148 As such, 
courts and practitioners should not wait on Congress to establish a 
temporal boundary to coverage. To do so would sacrifice the interests of 
injured workers and their employers and cause harm to an industry integral 
to the national economy. 
Furthermore, waiting for congressional action is not necessary. The 
plain language of the statute bears sufficient authority. The LHWCA 
already requires that the injury in question occur in the course of 
employment, just as other workers’ compensation structures do.149 The 
Act requires employment to be maritime in nature.150 Finally, Section 
903(a) expressly describes the conventional activities that fall within the 
scope of employment as “loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling or 
building a vessel.”151 No reason stands to extend this language beyond its 
most straightforward meaning: Coverage only applies to those injuries 
incurred by employees who are actively engaged in the actual loading of 
a vessel (among the other tasks listed). 
Any further attenuation unnecessarily complicates application of the 
compensation structure. Expansion of the statute beyond this simple 
reading could not possibly be based on the letter of the law, but rather on 
some unfounded desire to extend coverage under the LHWCA farther than 
ever intended. Congress explicitly intended the statute to apply to those 
tasks “immediately” related to unloading, as they stated clearly in the 1972 
Amendments.152 
An appropriate interpretation of the case law also supports this 
reading. In Caputo, Pfeiffer, and Schwalb, the Supreme Court emphasized 
the tight link between the worker’s employment and the loading and 
unloading process. A requirement of immediacy is inferred. Courts should 
plainly read Schwalb’s assertion that the actual cessation of a particular 
                                                                                                             
 148. In addition to the amendments discussed here, the LHWCA was amended 
once more in 1984, on grounds unrelated to the subject matter at hand. Longshore 
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L No. 92-
576, 98 Stat. 1639. 
 149. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (2015). 
 150. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). 
 151. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). 
 152. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708. 
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task was determinative. This is not dicta: Temporality is determinative. 
While a clear assertion from Congress confirming the existence of a 
conservative temporal limit on LHWCA status is preferred, the same 
results can, and must, be reached by the judiciary. 
CONCLUSION 
The maritime industry remains the bedrock of the United States, 
both in terms of heritage and current economic and political impact. 
The industry thrives due to the hard work of American maritime 
laborers. Thus, the health of the United States is intimately entwined 
with the health of these men and women. The LHWCA provides 
maritime laborers with a safety net in case they get hurt on the job. 
American lawmakers are responsible for ensuring that this safety net 
does not have any holes. 
As it stands today, the LHWCA has one gaping hole that 
unnecessarily strains the industry and its workers. That hole exists in 
the lack of clarity regarding how to apply the status test for coverage. 
Particularly, how attenuated may an employee’s relationship to loading 
and unloading be to qualify for coverage? 
Incorporating, through statutory amendment, a temporal 
component to the status inquiry answers this question while achieving 
coverage that is both more beneficial to the maritime shipping industry 
and more in keeping with the intents of the statute. Moreover, no 
substantial harm would result: Those excluded from coverage would be 
those for whom federal coverage was never intended. Such individuals 
could seek compensation under the state compensation structures 
designed to protect them, and in so doing avoid the risks of lengthy and 
unsuccessful litigation. Until such amendment takes effect, the courts 
should embrace the temporality test as the best way to achieve the 
clarity Congress sought, but failed to attain, in 1972. The stakes are 
simply too high to wait for another amendment. 
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The temptation always exists to stretch a statute to meet the facts of a 
sympathetic case. However, doing so results in absurd and harmful 
conclusions, even for those workers exclusively covered by state law. 
Stretching the statute means also stretching—and weakening—
predictability in the adjudication of claims. Attenuating coverage may 
seem benevolent and equitable to a sympathetic judge that aims to 
compensate a maimed and despondent worker. In the end, a broad 
application hurts both the employee seeking immediate remedy and his 
employer, who bears the brunt of heightened litigation costs. A plain 
reading of statutory language, interpretation of congressional intent, and 
careful analysis of Supreme Court precedent insists upon a narrow 
temporal construction in assessing status under the LHWCA. Industry 
workers, courts, and administrative bodies must determine eligibility for 
LHWCA compensation accordingly in order to ensure the continued 
health of the industry and its workers. 
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